> Because apple isn’t in control of apple for data at rest
That's not really true if Apple also holds copies of your iCloud decryption keys. If they want to access your data, they already have all the necessary components.
Now we're going in full circle, so I'll just point you to the parent thread:
> One must understand that E2EE is used when you don't trust your service provider to handle your data. In other words, the adversary in your threat model is the service provider - and in this case, Apple. And what good is that encryption, if Apple obviously can do almost anything with your device?
Ironic, since if you follow the thread you'll learn that since Apple still has complete control of your device, it essentially still has access to the keys.
Let me re-phrase, by giving Apple control over the keys, you give control over the data to whoever controls apple - which is non-zero (Eg. LEO), and whoever may gain control (security vuln).
That's not really true if Apple also holds copies of your iCloud decryption keys. If they want to access your data, they already have all the necessary components.