> it created an even larger group of veterans who came back and described a war which-- even if the serviceperson believed in the aims of the U.S. gov't-- was clearly unwinnable
Was it really "unwinnable"? I watched "Vietnam in HD" which is a fantastic series if you're into that kind of thing. It is a difficult watch at times. What I gathered from that is most people seemed to blame the "seek and destroy" tactic. This involved prioritizing destroying enemy encampments, but not actually taking territory. There didn't seem to be line advancements or attempts to create new bases further into enemy territory.
I'm not a military strategist, and I have no idea the kinds of logistics required for it. I do know that it seemed to kill morale for soldiers to go take a hill, and then abandon it for the enemy to go back and take once again. Essentially taking the same ground over and over again. It seems like a lesson in futility.
It was unwinnable not because of the tactics used but because the war was a hollow gesture: we weren't supporting a viable, legitimate RVN, but rather a corrupt government that lacked the support of its people (and, at times, actively persecuted important factions of its people).
Based off of experience in Korea, US didn't want China to enter the war. To avoid this, the US couldn't commit to full-scale of invasion of North Vietnam, which I believe would have been necessary for victory. Without a full scale invasion, they thought that they could 'tickle' the enemy into submission by aerial bombing of the North combined with ground-army defense of the south. I believe they were over optimistic.
It's easy to say "yeah, if the US had more manpower and/or crossed into North Vietnam and/or used different tactics we could have won!" and maybe that's true, but proponents of this view often fail to consider the entry of China as a possible outcome.
That's certainly true. It was definitely a proxy war and iirc the North definitely received, at a minimum, support from China. I'm not incredibly well versed on the subject, especially the geopolitics at the time. Perhaps with all of that considered, the US was hamstrung a bit.
The Pentagon Papers were originally commissioned as a way of reinforcing the war effort and tuning it to find a way to win. They ended up being, among other things, a compendium of the reasons why that outcome was very unlikely.
Correct, if crushing the enemy was the goal, the only way to win was to take over cities, land and controlling as an occupying force. The military had oppressive and crippling rules of engagement put on them when fighting a guerrilla style war.
The alternative with political pressure would have been to work with China and Russia which at the time, communism was the biggest threat, so that wasn't an option.
Was it really "unwinnable"? I watched "Vietnam in HD" which is a fantastic series if you're into that kind of thing. It is a difficult watch at times. What I gathered from that is most people seemed to blame the "seek and destroy" tactic. This involved prioritizing destroying enemy encampments, but not actually taking territory. There didn't seem to be line advancements or attempts to create new bases further into enemy territory.
I'm not a military strategist, and I have no idea the kinds of logistics required for it. I do know that it seemed to kill morale for soldiers to go take a hill, and then abandon it for the enemy to go back and take once again. Essentially taking the same ground over and over again. It seems like a lesson in futility.