If I'm reading this right, it still doesn't compromise the data on chip (i.e., the card cannot be copied, the limits enforced by chip are kept, etc) but allowed to modify the chip so that a physically stolen card can be used without knowing the PIN because the POS erroneously accepts a PIN verification response from another chip. This described hack seems to be impossible in recent chip implementations as well, but I'm not eager to dig through specs to check.
Still, it is still similar to the chip analysis vulnerability in risk as it (a) requires physically stealing the card and modifying it - thus it doesn't enable the far more common scenarios of skimming the card by an ATM device or a person e.g. waiter; and (b) doesn't allow to clone the card, so purchases must be made quickly by people physically close to the thieves and operators doing the chip-modification, so it means a much greater chance of arresting the whole team than in the currently common fate of stolen US card data where you can just sell the data to people anonymously over internet, and they themselves can easily make cloned cards to make the risky part of actually obtaining the money/goods.
A skimmed card will just work on the first try. A card modified like this is still likely to trigger "stolen, call the police" message on the POS terminal.
