>> behavioural correction requires a certain percentage of individuals to bring and succeed in their cases
No it doesn't. Both the extensive use of the class form and punitive damages (or close substitutes) are virtually unique to the United States. Ad hoc regulation by an entrepreneurial plaintiff's bar acting without meaningful client input is not the not the only effective means to regulate businesses. On the contrary, plenty of countries arguably do a better job without the use of them at all.
The US is also uniquely suited to business innovation. I think that's no coincidence. Depending upon after-the-fact class action instead of up-front regulation means more focus on actual harm than fear of harm.
I also broadly wouldn't trust the US to be particularly good at government regulation until our elections are publicly funded. There's a lot of evidence that our legislation is distorted towards the interests of the moneyed. I don't think that's a recipe for energetic, effective business regulation.
> >> behavioural correction requires a certain percentage of individuals to bring and succeed in their cases
> No it doesn't.
It is necessary for class proceedings to induce behavioural modification, which is what we are talking about here. There are other means to bring about behavioural correction, but that was beyond the scope of my comments.
> Both the extensive use of the class form and punitive damages (or close substitutes) are virtually unique to the United States.
At least a dozen states have class procedures, but you may be right on punitive damages. Canada is quite close, but punitive measures are handed out sparingly.
>> Ad hoc regulation by an entrepreneurial plaintiff's bar acting without meaningful client input is not the not the only effective means to regulate businesses.
I partially agree; class proceedings are a poor substitute for regulation. However, a few points. First, in tandem with victim compensation and reduced litigation costs, some argue the behavioural modification aspect from financial consequence can act as a check-and-balance that requires no arbitrary intervention by the government to correct and prevent wrongdoing.
Second, class action are procedural in nature and the substance of the case must be founded on existing laws – often common law torts, but sometimes regulatory or administrative. The cost of enforcement via a class proceeding is relieved from the public purse, and no additional rights are conferred on victims by way of a class proceeding – only the vehicle for exercising those rights is modified.
Third, regulators are often not as aligned with victims as plaintiff lawyers in class proceedings. It is not unheard of, and in some places quite common, for regulators to be hired by the very institutions they are charged with regulating.
Moreover, one can gauge the effectiveness of the class proceeding in behavioural modification by observing the broad resistance to it, namely the widespread introduction of arbitration clauses. Perhaps not the behaviour it was intended to modify, but that itself speaks to the point.
> On the contrary, plenty of countries arguably do a better job without the use of them at all.
I tend to agree, depending on the circumstances, but it is a hotly contested point.
From what I've seen, the US already has pretty aggressive public sector regulation in most areas, more than we seem to have over here in the UK these days. It's still not a complete solution because regulators don't have the resources to be everywhere at once.
No it doesn't. Both the extensive use of the class form and punitive damages (or close substitutes) are virtually unique to the United States. Ad hoc regulation by an entrepreneurial plaintiff's bar acting without meaningful client input is not the not the only effective means to regulate businesses. On the contrary, plenty of countries arguably do a better job without the use of them at all.