What security holes can pickle cause? We used it for a while while training and saving our ML models which otherwise would have taken a lot of time to retrain each time the system starts.
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<pyshell#1>", line 1, in <module>
from pickle import loads; loads(payload) # don't do it...!
File "...\lib\pickle.py", line 1388, in loads
return Unpickler(file).load()
File "...\lib\pickle.py", line 864, in load
dispatch[key](self)
File "...\lib\pickle.py", line 1139, in load_reduce
value = func(*args)
ValueError: bad marshal data (unknown type code)
Well, like eval(), it's only a security issue if you're reading pickled files from untrusted sources (that is, anywhere an attacker could have modified them). If you just ship them along with your Python source files, then it's a moot problem, since the attacker could just edit the source files.
In that example, subclasses of Runnable can be transferred. However, only the corpus of the "execute" method and the "properties" object is transferred. If you need to access modules, you'd have to import them inside the execute method.
