I think you're generalizing too much. Rural communities take gun safety seriously. Farming communities take farming equipment seriously. Kids grow up internalizing the seriousness of these things, which is communicated expressly and tacitly their whole lives by countless people around them, including their friends. Plus they encounter walking examples of what can go wrong, like a missing finger, burn scars (not careful around bonfires or burn pits), or bullet holes (I knew at least 2 or 3 kids growing up with scars from shot). But put those same kids or adults who are careful with those machines in a similarly dangerous but novel situation, and they'll do dumb shit like anyone else. I'm tempted to argue they're more likely to do something dumb because they have a false confidence from their experience with other dangerous situations, whereas suburban and city kids may be more likely to be too scared to play around with any dangerous machine or situation.
I lived on a farm for a year as a young kid (farmer rented a couple of trailers on his land). I remember one day I was hanging around the hog pen watching the giant hogs mill about, probably contemplating trying to pet one. Mr Austin came by and sternly told me to not to reach through the fencing, then knelt down and showed me his ear, which was missing a big chunk.
San Francisco doesn't have alleys, either, not anymore than NYC. In older buildings, including older apartment buildings, trash cans are kept under stairways, in service rooms, in ground-level hallways, or for single-family homes in garages or backyards, then wheeled out to the sidewalk the night before collection day, blocking pedestrians. Then the garbage men have to roll those bins into the street, maneuvering around parked cars, etc. NYC doesn't have trash cans because New Yorkers perennially chose to continue to throw their trash on the ground like they always had. Blame unions, blame habituation, but you can't blame NYC's architecture and layout; nothing about it is unique compared to other cities globally or even nationally.
The fact China had a huge smog problem, with hundreds of millions of people choking on coal emissions like it was 19th century London, also had something to do with it.
And Shenzen as an example would be an absolute hellhole if they hadn't mandated all electric vehicles, from tuktuks, motorbikes (must be electric) and taxis. This would have impacted ability to engage in the rapid economic growth seen there.
In a city like San Francisco, relative to the status quo ante easier development is more likely to result in slower growth in home prices, not a reduction in home prices.
But that's not the reason most San Franciscans oppose development. The primary reasons are 1) they're convinced more development will raise prices, 2) they believe affordability must be mandated through price controls or subsidies (e.g. developers dedicating X% of units for below market prices), 3) they insist on bike shedding every development proposal to death, 4) they're convinced private development is inherently inequitable (only "luxury" housing is built).
Pretty much the only group of people in the city worried about housing stock increases reducing prices are developers trying to sell-off new units. But developers are repeat players, and they're generally not the ones lending support to development hurdles. Though, there is (was?) at least one long-time developer who specializes in building "affordable" housing--mostly at public expense, of course--who did aggressively lobby for development hurdles, but carefully crafted so he and only he could easily get around them.
Alternatively, since we're spit balling, the administrators and/or accounting staff decided to strategically error on the side of a shortfall because its politically impossible to get the state to fully fund the pension obligations or to stop effectively raiding it.
The Iran War never looked good on paper. The only people who thought it would succeed were Trump and the cast of characters he surrounded himself with. I doubt if many congressional Republican chickenhawks thought it would succeed.
The only way to oust the regime is with ground troops, ripping out the Revolutionary Guard and its tentacles. For all its corruption, Iran is far from a failed state, and there aren't factions waiting in the wings, ready and willing to take over the government with force. (There are political factions, to be sure, but they're already integrated into the government, though without leverage over the Revolutionary Guard.) The only armed group remotely capable of even trying would be the Kurds, but the US and in particular Trump screwed them over in the past, multiple times. Even if they thought they could go it alone (which they couldn't), there was zero chance they were going to enter the fray without the US committing itself fully with their own invasion force (i.e. success was guaranteed), because failure would mean ethnic Kurds would be extirpated from Iran, and might induce Iraq and Syria to revisit the question of Kurdish loyalty to their own states. And, indeed, Kurdish groups took a wait and see approach, assembling some forces but waiting to see how the US played their cards.
It's just so ridiculous. Nobody is going to be writing books about the mistakes or hubris of US intelligence, military strategists, or political scholars and analysts. Even the most diehard American proponents of regime change in Iran, at least those with any competence, could have predicted (and did predict) this outcome. This was 100% a Trump fiasco, though the whole country shares some culpability for this kind of epic failure by allowing someone like Trump to win the presidency... again.
It's a little ironic that its due in part[1] to Trump's reticence to commit ground forces that we've come to this pass. I hesitate to criticize that disposition, but at the same time it's malfeasance to start a war without being willing and able to fully commit to the objective.
[1] Assuming the war had to happen, which of course it didn't.
> The Iran War never looked good on paper. The only people who thought it would succeed were Trump and the cast of characters he surrounded himself with.
Not to nitpick, but “looked good on paper” was an euphemism for “the powers that be think its doable”. Amd yes, yiu are right: Trump surrounded himself with “loyalist” this time that won’t go against hime like in the previous administration, but with the very undesirable effect of amplifying the echo chamber he lives in.
And like someone said in this thread, lots of hubris.
I am no expert on Iran, but all documentaries that I’ve seen about this reach the same conclusion: you don’t invade Iran using ground forces.
An invasion likely would turn into a quagmire, but what keeps regime proponents eternally hopeful is that unlike Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, etc, Iran has a robust political system. The dictatorship notwithstanding, it has a vibrant parliament and, by global standards, a decent electoral system. The Ayatollah rules by following the maxim, keep your friends close and your enemies closer. If you could excise the Revolutionary Guard (a big if), you wouldn't necessarily need to change the government or its institutions. The existing liberal and moderate factions could quickly fill the vacuum, and would be happy to do so. You wouldn't get a pliant Iran, but that's for the better.
So by invasion the idea would be to rapidly, physically excise the apparatus the Ayatollahs use to maintain control. The structure and identity of that group is well known. It's a large group, and you couldn't catch all the leaders, but so long as you can stop their ability to enforce their rule through execution, you give the rest of the country time to shut them out of the institutions. In theory just weeks.
The problem is the very thing that makes regime change a plausibly good idea--a stable polity and modern, liberal-ish institutions--is the very thing that could result in failure. The Ayatollahs understood that a fragile, backwards system would be a weakness to their rule. Their military and bureaucracy are professional; they know how to follow orders, without being micromanaged, and even if everyone wants regime change, there's a huge collective action problem.
I use anchovy fillets in alot of recipes to add umami and nutrients, not just sauces but also things like meatloaf. Fishiness dissipates pretty quickly with heat, even faster with acidic ingredients like tomatoes, citrus, or vinegar. It's pretty easy to modulate fishiness, even with just acid. I double or triple the anchovies in a typical caesar dressing recipe, and if I feel I over did it just adding more lemon juice tamps it down.
One of my kids is pretty picky, even sensitive to onions, but doesn't seem to pick up on the anchovies. She'll eat fish, though, depending on mood, so maybe she's not the best benchmark.
I use massive amounts of anchovies in my cooking and various types of processed fish generally. They do not trigger the extremely strong “rancid fish” effect of e.g. Vietnamese fish sauce that some people can taste even in small quantities.
The anchovies disappear into the food. For people like me, the fish sauce never does, you just get a mouthful of rancid fish taste. People gave up trying to hide it from me years ago because nothing really seems to work.
IIRC, the Inuit reached North America from the West right about the time the Vikings reached it from the East, but they managed to colonize and stay, displacing the native inhabitants and eventually spreading to Greenland, again displacing the natives. Their technological advantages were their kayaks and hunting strategies, so presumably the displacement was less violent.
It is notable that the median monthly rent was $35/month on a median income of $3000, so ~15% of income spent on rental housing. But it's interesting reading that report because a significant focus was on the overcrowding "problem". Housing was categorized by number of rooms, not number of bedrooms. The median number of rooms was 4, and the median number of occupants >4 per unit (or more than 1 person per room). I don't think it's a stretch to say that the amount of space and facilities you get for your money today is roughly equivalent. Yes, greater percentage of your income goes to housing, and yet we have far more creature comforts today then back in 1950--multiple TVs, cellphones, appliances, and endless amounts of other junk. We can buy many more goods (durable and non-durable) for a much lower percentage of our income.
What an interesting paper you found! Home ownership stats in contemporary times are quite misleading because of debt. Most home owners now are still paying rent in the form of a mortgage to a bank. In the 50s most home owners genuinely owned their homes 'free and clear'. The exact rate was 56% in the 1951 per your paper (which was a local low), and now it's at 40% which is a local high. And the contemporary demographics are all messed up - it's largely driven by older to elderly individuals in non-urban low-income states.
As for number of occupants, the 50s had a sustainable fertility rate. That means, on average, every woman was having at least 2 kiddos. So a median 4 occupant house would be husband, wife, and 2 children living in a place with a master bedroom, kids room, a combined kitchen/dining room, and a living room. Bathrooms, oddly enough, did not count as rooms. So in modern parlance it'd mostly be a 2/2 for up to 14% of one person's median income, and 0% in most cases as most people 'really' owned their homes.
We definitely have lots more gizmos, but I feel like that's an exchange that relatively few people would make in hindsight.
I sometimes feel that the facts are all out there, but half the people pick one half the facts as causal and the other half pick the other half. Are home prices rising because people have fewer kids (and therefore more to spend on housing) or are people having fewer kids because house prices are rising (and therefore less to spend on kids)?
I suspect that it's a complex mixture of all possibilities, and you can only really look at trends and your own life - the one thing you can have something resembling understanding and control.
I have a different take on it altogether. Religion previously worked as a sort of philosophical compass for life. It provided meaning and purpose, but as society has largely left religion behind, this left a void that was never really cleanly filled. So then in a post-religion society, what becomes the purpose in life? And I think for many, they simply have grabbed the lowest hanging fruit, even if subconsciously - wealth and materialism. And in this worldview there's not much room for children.
I think my little hypothesis here works to cleanly explain fertility crises much better than any other alternative. For instance the typical income:fertility hypothesis or education:fertility hypothesis both have endless glaring counter-examples like Thailand where the society is relatively poor with relatively low education, yet has a fertility rate now lower than even Japan.
It also explains the paradox of upper middle class couples claiming that they aren't having children because they don't have enough money, while lower income couples continue to have relatively healthy fertility rates, and it's for the same reason that extremely high income couples have relatively healthy fertility rates. Extremes of high and low income largely exclude one from materialism simply because there's no carrot to chase, whether because you can have it at any time you want, or simply because it's so far away that there's no hope of ever getting closer to it.
> Are home prices rising because people have fewer kids (and therefore more to spend on housing) or are people having fewer kids because house prices are rising (and therefore less to spend on kids)?
Maybe a false dichotomy? My suspicion is that home prices rise because more credit becomes available (and not only homes prices but the price of other assets). If you think about it in broader terms this explains what happens to the fruits of our increased productivity - lenders extend more credit as productivity rises thereby claiming the benefit for themselves. The working person is still stuck with a 40 hour week because despite being more productive they have more debt to service.
There's something there, definitely - reading "ordinary man's guide to the financial life" from different eras is informative; many of the older ones work really hard to convince you that a home loan is something worth getting and "you'll pay it off faster than you think" - now we have guides talking about "good debt" and "never pay it off".
I lived on a farm for a year as a young kid (farmer rented a couple of trailers on his land). I remember one day I was hanging around the hog pen watching the giant hogs mill about, probably contemplating trying to pet one. Mr Austin came by and sternly told me to not to reach through the fencing, then knelt down and showed me his ear, which was missing a big chunk.
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